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The Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 (2002 Farm Act) was enacted in May of 2002.  
While this new farm law introduced some new policies to the array of agricultural commodity programs, 
in many ways the 2002 Farm Act extended provisions of the 1996 Farm Act and institutionalized 
provisions of ad hoc emergency spending bills of 1998-2001. 
 
Three key commodity program features of the 2002 Farm Act are marketing assistance loans,  
counter-cyclical payments, and direct payments.  Marketing assistance loans existed under previous  
U.S. farm law, direct payments replaced production flexibility contract payments of the 1996 Farm Act, 
and counter-cyclical payments are intended to institutionalize the market loss assistance payments of the 
past several years. 
 
This paper discusses these policy features of the 2002 Farm Act and some of their potential impacts on 
agricultural markets, with a focus on upland cotton.  An overview of these program provisions from the 
new law is first presented.  This is followed by a discussion of some of the income support properties of 
these programs, using illustrations of a cotton farm’s sources of revenues under the new farm act.  Then a 
general discussion of some of the potential avenues for these programs to influence production decisions 
is given.  Implications for 2003 plantings for upland cotton are then presented, using an acreage response 
forecasting model that bases land use allocation decisions on farmers’ expected net returns. 
 
 
Overview of Major Commodity Provisions of the 2002 Farm Act 
 
Three major commodity programs in the 2002 Farm Act for crops are marketing assistance loans, 
counter-cyclical payments, and direct payments.   
 
Marketing assistance loans 
 
Marketing loan provisions of the 2002 Farm Act extended those of the 1996 Farm Act.  Loan rates were 
raised for most crops covered under the previous legislation, although loan rates for soybeans were 
lowered and loan rates for rice were not changed.  Marketing loan provisions were added for new 
commodities, including peanuts, wool, mohair, dry edible peas, lentils, and small chickpeas.  
Additionally, implementation of the new farm act introduced different loan rates for 5 classes of wheat 
and for the different minor oilseeds. 
 
Marketing loans provide benefits to farmers of loan commodities through loan deficiency payments and 
marketing loan gains when market prices are low.  Marketing loans also reduce revenue risk associated 




rate by pledging their production of the loan commodity as collateral.  They may repay the loan at a 
lower repayment rate at any time during the loan period that market prices are below the loan rate.  
Alternatively, farmers of commodities covered by the loan programs (except extra-long staple cotton) 
may choose to receive marketing loan benefits through direct loan deficiency payments (LDP).  The 
LDP option allows the producer to receive marketing loan benefits without having to take out and 
subsequently repay a commodity loan.  The LDP rate is equivalent to the marketing loan gain that 
farmers could obtain for production placed under loan.  
 
Marketing loan benefits are available on all current production of eligible loan commodities, and 
benefits are linked to market prices.  Marketing loans are thus considered to be fully coupled, potentially 




Counter-cyclical payments (CCPs) under the 2002 Farm Act are available for wheat, feed grains, upland 
cotton, rice, soybeans, minor oilseeds, and peanuts when market prices are below levels set forth in the 
legislation.  Under the new law, a target price is established for each crop, as well as a fixed payment 
rate for direct payments.  When the higher of the loan rate or the season average price plus the direct 
payment rate is below the target price, a counter-cyclical payment is made, at a rate equal to that 
difference.  Equivalently, CCPs are made when the higher of the loan rate or the season average price is 
below the target price minus the direct payment rate. 
 
For example, the upland cotton target price for 2003 is $0.724 a pound, the direct payment rate is 
$0.0667 a pound, and the loan rate is $0.52 a pound.  If the season average price for upland cotton is 
$0.55 a pound (above the loan rate), the $0.724 target price minus $0.6167 ($0.55 price plus $0.0667 
direct payment rate) gives a $0.1073 CCP payment rate.  This payment rate can be alternatively 
expressed as $0.6573 (the $0.724 target price minus the $0.0667 direct payment rate) minus the $0.55 
season average price.  This alternative expression indicates that the price cutoff where the CCP payment 
rate becomes zero is at $0.6573, not the $0.724 target price.  Thus, when the season average price is 
above $0.6573 (the target price minus the fixed direct payment rate), no counter-cyclical payment is 
made.  When the season average price is below the target price minus the fixed direct payment rate, a 
counter-cyclical payment is made, with the CCP payment rate increasing as prices fall.  The maximum 
CCP payment rate is attained when prices are at or below the loan rate. 
 
CCPs are paid on a portion of historical acreage (85 percent of base acreage) and on historically-based 
program yields and, thus, are not affected by a farmer’s current production.  Consequently, CCPs are 
largely decoupled from an individual farmer’s planting decisions.  However, the link of counter-cyclical 





Direct payments under the 2002 Farm Act are similar to production flexibility contract payments of 
the 1996 Farm Act.  The payment rate for direct payments is fixed for each crop ($0.0667 a pound for 
upland cotton) and is not affected by current production or by current market prices.  Direct payments 
to farmers are based on historical acreage (85 percent of base acreage) and on historically-based 
program yields.  These payments are the most decoupled from planting decisions of the three 





Income Support Under the 2002 Farm Act 
 Upland Cotton Illustrations  
 
Upland cotton market revenues and program payments at different price levels illustrate some of the 
properties of income-support provisions of the 2002 Farm Act (figures 1-3).  Revenue calculations for 
these examples are for 100 acres of upland cotton and assume 100 acres of upland cotton base, as well.  
Cotton yields of 640 pounds an acre are assumed, with a program-payment yield of 605 pounds an acre 
used for direct payments and a CCP program yield of 625 pounds an acre.  In this example, the farmer is 
assumed to plant the same crop as the acreage base.  
 
Revenues from decoupled payments 
 
Figure 1 focuses on direct payments and counter-cyclical payments.  These payments are decoupled 
from current production because the payments are made on 85 percent of the upland cotton base acreage 
and on fixed payment yields regardless of whether upland cotton is planted on the land.   
 
CCPs are provided when prices are below the target price minus the fixed direct payment rate ($0.724 
minus $0.0667, or $0.6573, for upland cotton).  Payments increase as prices decline below $0.6573 until 
prices reach the loan rate ($0.52 for upland cotton).   For prices below the loan rate, counter-cyclical 
payments are at their maximum and do not change. 
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Market revenues and program payments, basic case 
 
Figure 2 shows all revenue sources for this upland cotton farm situation in which the farmer is assumed 
to plant the same crop as the acreage base.  In this illustration, market receipts and fully coupled 
marketing loan benefits for the farm are combined with the decoupled payments of figure 1.  The 
portions of figure 2 labeled “Market revenue” represents receipts from the marketplace, which increase 
as market prices rise.   
 
The triangle labeled “LDP/MLG” in figure 2 represents marketing loan benefits in the form of loan 
deficiency payments (LDPs) and/or marketing loan gains (MLGs) that supplement market revenues at 
market prices below the $0.52 loan rate for upland cotton.  As prices fall below the loan rate, marketing 
loan benefits rise and fully offset declines in market revenues since these program benefits are available 
for all production. 
  
The area labeled “Counter-cyclical” represents the counter-cyclical payments under the 2002 Farm Act.  
As shown in figure 1, counter-cyclical payments are linked to market prices, with payments provided 
when prices are below the target price minus the direct payment rate ($0.6573 a pound for upland 
cotton).  Again, CCPs change in the price range from the $0.52 upland cotton loan rate to $0.6573.  
Counter-cyclical payments do not fully offset reductions in market revenues as prices fall within this 
price range because payments are on 85 percent of the acreage base and are paid on CCP program yields 
rather than actual yields. 
 
The area of figure 2 labeled “Direct payments” are fixed payments of $0.0667 a pound for upland 
cotton, paid on 85 percent of the acreage base and a direct payment program yield.  These payments do 

















Cotton revenues under the 2002 Farm Act
Assumes 100 acres cotton, 100 acres cotton base, 640 lbs/acre yield, 


















Marketing loan benefits and counter-cyclical payments likely to overlap 
 
Additional interesting properties of these farm act provisions can also result from the interaction of these 
income support measures in some price ranges.  Figure 3 extends the analysis of figure 2 to illustrate 
that counter-cyclical payments are likely to overlap with counter-cyclical aspects of marketing loan 
benefits in certain price ranges.  In figure 2, marketing loan benefits are assumed only for prices below 
the loan rate.  However, marketing loans have enabled farmers to attain per-unit revenues that, on 
average, exceed commodity loan rates when prices are relatively low.  Many farmers use a two-step 
marketing procedure in which they receive program benefits when prices are seasonally low (and 
marketing loan benefits high) and then sell the crop later in the marketing year when prices have risen.  
In addition, for upland cotton, use of the adjusted world price as the repayment rate for marketing loans 
and to calculate loan deficiency payment rates also may add to total revenues of producers, reflecting 
any difference between that price and the domestic price received by farmers. 
 
Figure 3 includes a representative level of 4.5 cents a pound for upland cotton for the expected above-
loan-rate revenue facilitated by marketing loans when prices are low, based on the experience of recent 
years.  Realized, average per-unit revenue (market revenue plus the average marketing loan benefit per 
pound) for upland cotton was about $0.564 to $0.565 in 2000 and 2001, or about $0.045 to $0.046 above 
the $0.5192 loan rate for those years. 
 
If marketing loans for upland cotton continue to provide this level of above-loan-rate revenue when 
prices are low, counter-cyclical payments overlap with counter-cyclical aspects of marketing loan 
benefits in the price range from $0.52 to $0.565, in effect providing two counter-cyclical benefits to 
farmers.  As prices rise in this price range, both counter-cyclical payments and marketing loan benefits 
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Cotton revenues under the 2002 Farm Act,
with above-loan-rate marketing loan benefit

















Potential Effects of 2002 Farm Act on Agricultural Production 
 
Potential influences of the 2002 Farm Act on agricultural commodity markets involve the interaction of 
various types of programs that may have direct and indirect influences on production, particularly 
effects of marketing loans, counter-cyclical payments, and direct payments.  While marketing loans 
benefits are fully coupled, less direct market impacts may result from the other income support 
programs.  Some of the issues in assessing effects of the 2002 Farm Act relate to whether various types 
of income-support programs that provide program benefits that are decoupled from a producer’s current 
levels of production may, nonetheless, provide indirect incentives that influence production decisions 
and overall output.  Although qualitative arguments suggest that counter-cyclical payments and direct 
payments could have some indirect influences on production, those effects are likely to be relatively 
small.  This is particularly the case when one considers the farm household as the decision-making 
entity, rather than only the farm operation, with a wide array of consumption, savings, nonagricultural 
and agricultural investment, and off-farm and on-farm labor allocations that may adjust in response to 
decoupled payments (Burfisher and Hopkins). 
  
Marketing loan effects 
 
Marketing loan benefits are based on current production and market prices and thus have the most 
potential to influence production decisions of farmers, particularly when prices are relatively low.  
 
Table 1 shows marketing assistance loan rates for upland cotton and competing crops under the 2002 
Farm Act compared with 2001 loan rates under previous legislation.  The loan rate for upland cotton was 
raised slightly under the new legislation.  Loan rates for sorghum, wheat, and corn were raised relatively 





Wheat ($/bu)  2.58  2.80  2.75
Corn ($/bu)  1.89  1.98  1.95
Sorghum ($/bu)  1.71  1.98  1.95
Upland cotton ($/lb)  0.5192  0.52  0.52
Soybeans ($/bu)  5.26  5.00  5.00
Table 1
Marketing assistance loan rates, selected crops,









Counter-cyclical payment effects 
 
Counter-cyclical payments under the 2002 Farm Act do not change with a farmer’s current production 
since they are paid on a constant, pre-determined quantity for the farm (equal to 85 percent of a fixed 
acreage base times a fixed CCP payment yield).  Although the updating of base acreage and the updating 
of yields used for CCPs will result in greater CCP payment quantities than otherwise, the expected 
marginal revenue of a farmer’s additional current output is the expected market price (augmented by 
marketing loan benefits when prices are relatively low), so counter-cyclical payments do not affect 
production directly through expected net returns.  
 
However, because counter-cyclical payments are linked to market prices, they may influence production 
decisions indirectly by reducing total and per unit revenue risk associated with price variability in some 
situations.  In the price range from the loan rate up to the target price minus the direct payment rate, 
changes in producer revenues due to changes in market prices are partly offset by the counter-cyclical 
payments if the base acreage crop is planted (or a crop with highly correlated prices with the base 
acreage crop), thereby reducing total revenue risk associated with price variability. 
 
If there is value to the farmer in reducing the variability of expected revenues (such as for a risk-averse 
producer or their risk-averse lender), the negative correlation between the expected counter-cyclical 
payments for the program crop and the expected market revenues for the same crop (or for a highly 
price-correlated alternative crop) may have some influence on production choices.  This revenue 
stabilization consideration would supplement the typical profit maximization incentive underlying 
planting decisions.  
 
The revenue risk reduction of CCPs provides a new risk management instrument to farmers, which 
may lead to adjustments in their use of alternative farm and nonfarm risk management strategies.  
For risk-averse farmers, the revenue risk reduction provided by counter-cyclical payments may, in some 
cases, encourage farmers to plant the program crop for which they have base acreage (or a crop for 
which prices are highly correlated to those of the program crop).  If the base acreage crop is planted, the 
season average market price of the crop produced would be the same price used to determine the 
counter-cyclical payment, so the reduction in variability of total revenues due to CCPs is most direct.  
Alternatively, because CCPs reduce overall revenue risk, a farmer may switch some land to riskier crops 
that provide higher mean expected returns but also higher variability of those returns.  
 
Two extensions of this general discussion of CCPs are important for upland cotton.  First, State-level 
prices for upland cotton in cotton-producing States (as a proxy for local, farm-level prices) are highly 
correlated with the national price for upland cotton.  Thus, cotton CCPs are likely to provide price risk 
protection to individual farmers who plant cotton on their cotton base acres.  However, prices of 
competing crops are not highly correlated with cotton prices, so cotton CCPs would not provide much 
cross-commodity price variability protection if cotton base acreage were switched to an alternative crop. 
This suggests that price risk protection of cotton CCPs may, in some circumstances (in some market 
price situations and for some farmers), keep cotton base acreage planted to cotton.  (This contrasts with 
the situation for corn and soybeans, for example, in States such as Iowa and Illinois, which have 
relatively high cross-commodity price correlations.) 
 
Second, while CCPs may protect against price risk in some price ranges, as long as prices for upland 






While this discussion provides qualitative arguments for counter-cyclical payments to have some 
influence on agricultural production, the magnitude of the effects is an empirical issue and a topic for 
further research.  Although expected net returns would likely remain a dominant consideration in 
cropping choices for most situations, revenue risk reduction provided by counter-cyclical payments 
would be likely to have the greatest potential to affect production choices for risk-averse producers. 
 
Direct payment effects 
Direct payments are largely decoupled since program benefits do not depend on the farmer’s production 
or market conditions, and the payments do not affect per unit returns.  However, direct payments are tied 
to acreage, so these benefits will be capitalized into farmland values, thereby increasing aggregate 
producer wealth.  Mechanisms for direct payments to potentially affect production decisions are 
(1) a direct wealth effect through risk aversion reduction, and (2) a wealth-facilitated increased 
investment effect partly reflecting reduced credit constraints. 
Direct payments increase farmers’ wealth, reflecting gains in farm sector equity that result from the 
capitalization of expected future farm program benefits into the value of farmland.  These payments may 
affect production somewhat if the changes in wealth influence farmers’ perception of, attitudes toward, 
and responses to potential financial risks associated with production alternatives.  If payments raise 
producers’ wealth and lower their risk aversion, they may take on more risk in their production choices.  
This may entail a choice to increase overall production and may also change the mix of production, 
perhaps switching to riskier crops with higher mean (but more variable) expected returns.  
Higher cash flow provided by direct payments and higher net worth resulting from these benefits can 
also facilitate additional agricultural production through increases in agricultural investment if farmers 
otherwise face credit constraints or limited liquidity.  Some of the payments are likely to go to 
consumption, savings, and nonagricultural investments, with the largest share typically going to 
consumption.  However, agricultural investment can also rise for farmers who were credit constrained, 
as lenders may be more willing to make loans to farmers with higher guaranteed incomes, higher farm 
equity, and lower risk of default.  Greater loan availability facilitates additional agricultural production 
by allowing these farmers to more easily invest in profitable opportunities on their farm operations.  
Additionally, the reduced risk of default could lead to lower interest rates on loans to farmers, also 
facilitating an increase in investment in farm operations. 
For some farmers, increased liquidity provided by the payments also may reduce the need for obtaining 
loans for short-term operating costs or for longer term farm-related investments.  While there would be 
opportunity costs associated with self-financing and using these funds in the farm operation, those 
opportunity costs would be lower than commercial loan expenses.  This lower cost of capital could lead 
to an increase in the overall size of the current operation and could raise the level of investment in the 
farm, both of which would increase farm output.   
To the extent that direct payments influence production through these wealth and investment 
mechanisms, they would do so similarly to the decoupled production flexibility contract payments under 
the 1996 Farm Act.  A recent study (Burfisher and Hopkins) using farm household survey data 
concludes that production flexibility contract payments improved the well-being of recipients, enabling 
increased consumption, savings, investment, and leisure by households, but with minimal effects on 
agricultural production.  Further, since the overall average annual magnitudes of direct payments and 
production flexibility contract payments are comparable at about $5 billion, no new effects are 
anticipated under the 2002 Farm Act.  Similarly, projected annual direct payments for upland cotton 
under the 2002 Farm Act also are about the same as average annual production flexibility contract 




Implications for Upland Cotton Acreage in 2003 
Farmers respond to expected net returns in their land use decisions.  As such, upland cotton plantings in 
2003 will reflect 3 main factors.  First, market prices and expected net returns for cotton and for 
competing crops will provide economic incentives for farmers to choose among different cropping 
alternatives.  Second, policy influences, particularly of marketing loans, will augment expected net 
returns from the marketplace for upland cotton and, thus, may influence planting decisions.  Third, the 
responsiveness of cotton plantings to net returns for cotton and to net returns for competing crops will 
combine with the market signals and policy influences to shape the final outcome. 
 
Market price and marketing loan benefit incentives 
Prices for upland cotton are currently stronger than a year ago.  Monthly prices received by farmers 
recently have been 10 to 15 cents a pound higher than the same month in the previous year.  Also, 
USDA’s year-to-date, weighted-average price, as reported in the February 2003 World Agricultural 
Supply And Demand Estimates report (USDA, OCE, 2003b), was 40.5 cents a pound, exceeding both 
the 32.4 cent year-to-date price available in February last year and the 2001/02 season average price of 
29.8 cents a pound.  Despite these increases, upland cotton prices remain below the 52 cent loan rate, 
so increased planting incentives related to higher prices are offset by correspondingly lower marketing 
loan benefits. 
Prices received by farmers for competing crops also are higher than a year ago.  However, in contrast to 
upland cotton, prices for sorghum, corn, wheat, and soybeans are higher than their loan rates and, 
therefore, producer per-unit revenues are not fully offset by lower marketing loan benefits.  Thus, 
planting incentives for these alternative crops are stronger than a year ago.  
 
Supply response modeling system 
To assess the implications for 2003 plantings of upland cotton implied by these market prices and 
marketing loan benefits for cotton and competing crops, a USDA/ERS acreage response model was 
used.  This modeling system covers eight major field crops and uses net returns as the basis for 
allocating acreage among cropping alternatives.   
The acreage response model incorporates a modified version of the estimated elasticities from Lin et al. 
Results of that study show that full planting flexibility under the 1996 Farm Act and subsequent farm 
legislation has allowed farmers to respond to economic incentives in their cropping choices and has 
resulted in greater acreage-price elasticities than in the past.  Summary elasticities used in the acreage 
response model for upland cotton are shown in table 2, which measure the responsiveness of plantings to 
prices for upland cotton and competing crops. 
 
Cotton Acreage Surveys 
The National Cotton Council released estimates of expected 2003 cotton plantings in early February.  
These estimates are based on an early-season planting intentions survey of growers taken in late 
December through January.  Survey results indicated U.S. upland cotton plantings of 13.864 million 
acres and ELS plantings of 184,000 acres, for a total of 14.048 million acres. 
The first USDA indicator of U.S. cotton acreage for 2003 will be released by USDA’s National 
Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS) at the end of March in the Prospective Plantings report.  This 



















2003 upland cotton acreage prospects 
 
Implications suggest a small reduction of about 160,000 acres for plantings of upland cotton in 2003, 
largely reflecting relatively higher economic incentives for planting competing crops.  This can be 
interpreted as a reduction from a “weather-neutral” and “policy-uncertainty neutral” level of plantings in 
2002. 
 
The latest NASS estimate for 2002 upland cotton plantings is 13.719 million acres.  This compares with 
the initial 2002 planting intentions estimate of 14.496 million acres in the NASS Prospective Plantings 
report last March.  Weather problems were not a significant factor that interfered with upland cotton 
plantings in 2002.  However, policy uncertainty in the spring of 2002, particularly regarding the 
potential for changes in payment limitation provisions, may have contributed to some of the reduction in 
upland cotton plantings from the initial intentions estimate.  Assuming that without the policy 
uncertainty last spring, upland cotton plantings would have been 500,000 acres higher (part, but not all, 
of the reduction in plantings from intentions to the latest NASS estimate) gives a “policy-uncertainty 
neutral” level of upland cotton plantings in 2002 of 14.219 million acres.  Then, the 160,000 acre 
reduction in plantings for 2003 implied by market and policy factors puts this year’s projected 
upland cotton plantings at 14.0 to 14.1 million acres.  A reduction in ELS cotton plantings to about 
200,000 acres is likely in 2003 due to current low prices.  Thus, the overall plantings estimate for all 
cotton in 2003 is consistent with (and near the middle of) the USDA range for total cotton plantings of 
14.0 to 14.5 million acres. 
 
Actual plantings in 2003 could differ from these early-season prospects if economic incentives for 
planting upland cotton or the major competing crops change before plantings.  Also, unusual year-
specific events, such as weather problems, could alter plantings prospects, such as occurred in 1998 
when wet field conditions related to El Niño contributed to reduced plantings of upland cotton in 





USDA Baseline for Upland Cotton 
 
USDA released its latest 10-year baseline projections in early February.  Copies of that report are 
available at this forum and on the internet (USDA, OCE, 2003a).  USDA baseline projections for upland 
cotton plantings over the next decade are based on the same acreage response modeling system used 
here for the 2003 projections. 
 
Upland cotton plantings in the baseline are fairly flat within a 13.9 to 14.2 million acre range for the 
2004-12 projections.  Upland cotton plantings are somewhat higher in 2004-06, as prices for competing 
crops decline from recent high levels.  Upland cotton acreage then falls slightly over the remaining 
projection years.  Domestic mill use of upland cotton declines slowly through the baseline projection 
period as the apparel industry’s demand for fabric and yarn produced in the United States is reduced 
following the elimination of textile and apparel import quotas originally instituted under the Multi-Fiber 
Arrangement.  Additionally, exports of cotton remain relatively stable in the baseline as foreign 
competition strengthens and keeps U.S. cotton exports from expanding above the recent 75-year high.  
Thus, with this relatively weak long-term demand growth setting for cotton, baseline projections for 
upland cotton plantings largely mirror price movements for competing crops, particularly when cotton 





Policy changes of the 2002 Farm Act include changing loan rates and expanding the marketing loan 
program, adding counter-cyclical payments, and replacing production flexibility contract payments with 
direct payments.  These programs may each affect agricultural commodity markets, although impacts 
vary due to the degree to which the programs are coupled to farmers’ production decisions. 
 
Marketing loans are fully coupled to current production and thus can influence planting choices of 
farmers, particularly when prices are relatively low.  Counter-cyclical payments may influence 
production choices because of their link to market prices, which can lower risks to producers by 
reducing the variability of revenues in some price ranges.  Direct payments are the least coupled of these 
programs, but may influence production through wealth and investment effects.  
 
Upland cotton plantings for 2003 are projected at 14.0 to 14.1 million acres, a moderate increase from 
plantings in 2002 of 13.719 million acres.  Upland cotton acreage in 2002 may have been reduced 
somewhat by policy uncertainties in the spring, particularly regarding potential changes in payment 
limitation provisions.  Without those uncertainties, plantings last year likely would have been higher.  
For 2003, planting incentives for crops competing with upland cotton are somewhat more favorable than 
in 2002, lowering expected plantings from last year’s adjusted “policy-uncertainty neutral” level.  
Longer run acreage projections from USDA’s baseline indicate upland cotton plantings remaining 





USDA Web Sites for 2002 Farm Act Information
• USDA Farm Act homepage
– http://www.usda.gov/farmbill
• Side by side comparison of 1996 and 2002 Farm Acts,
with selected analyses
– http://www.ers.usda.gov/features/farmbill
• Frequently asked questions
– http://www.fsa.usda.gov/pas/farmbill/fbfaqhome.asp
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